
## UNDERSTANDING CHANGES IN GARDEN-PATHS AS EXPECTATION ADAPTATION

Sentence processing seems to draw on implicit expectations about syntactic structures. Some theories hold that expectations are continuously *adapted* towards the syntactic statistics of the input<sup>1,2</sup>, minimizing average surprisal.<sup>3</sup> A few studies have found evidence qualitatively compatible with adaptation to new syntactic distributions.<sup>2–5</sup> Principled *models* and their quantitative test against human data, however, have been lacking. We test a Bayesian belief-updating model against data from two garden-path reading experiments<sup>3,6</sup> (N=77, 415 subjects; 71, 142 items, respectively). The experiments reported conflicting results. We find that both datasets are, in fact, captured by simple belief-updating. The syntactic priors inferred from the reading data are similar across experiments, *and* approximate syntactic statistics of language corpora.

**Data.** Both studies<sup>3,6</sup> investigated the main verb (MV)/relative clause (RC) ambiguity, using the same block design (Fig 1), but different items and numbers of items. Subjects were randomly assigned to either the *RC-First* or *Filler-First* group. The RC-First group read only RCs in Block 1. The Filler-First group read RCs and particular fillers. In Block 2, both groups read RCs and particular fillers. In Block 3, both groups read MVs. Half of the MV/RCs in each block contained the ambiguity (Latin-Squared). Block-based between-group (factor)



rial) analyses found adaptation in [3] but not [6]. But these analyses do not take into account that [6] doubled the number of MV/RCs per block, changing the predicted expectation adaptation. We ask whether belief-updating explains both results.

**Model prediction.** The theory of expectation adaptation predicts that listeners incrementally adapt their expectations based on the frequency of MVs and RCs in the input.<sup>3</sup> We operationalize this as beta-binomial belief-updating.<sup>4</sup> This model has two DFs (inferred from the RT data): the prior MV and RC counts ( $N_{MV}$ ,  $N_{RC}$ ). The counts encode the prior probabilities of MVs and RCs (e.g.,  $P(RC) = N_{RC}/N_{RC} + N_{MV}$ ). The sum of the parameters captures how relevant listeners consider prior experience in the current situation. We then incrementally update expectations (and thus surprisal<sup>7</sup>) each time subjects read an RC/MV (Fig 1).

**Analysis.** We corrected RTs for word length and log trial order to remove the effects of adaptation to self-paced reading. We fit linear mixed models to both datasets, predicting RTs in the disambiguation region from surprisal, Fig2: Fits to data by prior MV, RC counts (X=best)

ambiguity, and their interactions. We compare the surprisal model to a control model predicting RTs from the design variables–group x block (structure) x ambiguity.

**Results.** For both<sup>3,6</sup>, the surprisal model fits the data significantly better than the control, across a wide range of prior parameterizations

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across a wide range of prior parameterizations  $N_{MV}$   $N_{MV}$  (surprisal BIC < control BIC; blue and green regions in Fig 2). The best-fitting priors for both<sup>3,6</sup> were similar, as expected if subjects on average hold similar prior experience, and thus beliefs  $(N_{MV} = 44, 62; N_{RC} = 6.1, 1.1 \text{ for [3,6], respectively;} \rightarrow P(RC) = 0.1, 0.01)$ . The inferred priors make sense: from natural language use, we would expect  $\hat{P}(\text{RC}) = .011.^8$ 

**Conclusion.** Bayesian belief-updating captures changes in RTs and garden-path effects, even for data reported not to show adaptation.<sup>6</sup> The fact that the priors—inferred from comprehension data alone—match corpus data supports experience-based theories.<sup>9</sup> Comprehenders seem to adapt their syntactic expectations to the statistics of recent input.

<sup>1</sup>Chang et al 06-*PsyRev*; <sup>2</sup>Wells et al 09-*CogPsy*; <sup>3</sup>Fine et al 13-*PlosOne*; <sup>4</sup>Myslin&Levy 16-*Cognition*; <sup>5</sup>Ryskin et al 16-*JEP*; <sup>6</sup>Harrington Stack et al 18-*Mem&Cog*; <sup>7</sup>Hale 01-*ACL*; <sup>8</sup>Roland et al 07-*JML*; <sup>9</sup>MacDonald 13-*Frontiers*